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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES

In the brief compass of this note, it has been possible to
review only a few of the decisions of a comparatively small
number of courts which have had to deal with special interrogatories; but from a brief review such as here undertaken, and bearing in mind that the problem herein discussed is statutory in nature, the conclusion that may well
be reached is that the practice noted in recent decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals not
only indicates a departure from the rule of construction
applied to the statute permitting special initerrogatories,
previously well settled in this state, but also that perhaps
it may not be strictly in accord with the adjudications of
the courts of most of the other states having similar statutory provisions.
-G. D. H.
DIVORCE--EFFECT OF GENERAL AND PENAL RESTRICTIONS ON

EXTRATERRITORIAL SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGES OF DIVORCED
PERSONS.-The West Virginia Code provides that neither
party to a divorce suit shall again marry until six months
after the date of the decree, except to each other, and that
the court has the power to decree that the guilty p rty
shall not again marry for such period after the date of the
decree as the court shall deem wise, provided that it be not
over five years. It is further provided that if either of the
parties shall marry within the prohibited periods, except to
each other, the marriage shall be void, and the party shall
be criminally liable as if no divorce had been granted.'
These drastic provisions when the restricted party does marry in defiance of the court should be especially noted. After the expiration of one year from the date of the decree
the court may modify the restraint imposed on the guilty
2
party if good reason is shown for such action.
The restrictions to prevent divorced persons marrying
again after a decree granted fall within two distinct classes,-one, the same time restriction is put on both parties
regardless of guilt; and two, the restriction is imposed only
on the guilty party. These have been handled so differently in the various jurisdictions that they are best hand'

2

W. VA. CODE, 1923, c. 64, §14.
Supra, n. 1.
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led as separate topics, in considering how the West Virginia court could well construe its code provisions when
parties so bound do contract marriage outside of the state
and return to live in it. The cases decided by the West
Virginia court construing these code provisions are few in
number. It has been decided generally that the only authority a court of equity has to forbid marriage after granting a decree of divorce is that allowed by statute, and therefore the court can set no limitations other than those the
legislature has seen fit to set, 8 as statutes extending the
jurisdiction of courts are to be construed strictly so that the
courts' power will not be unduly extended in derogation
of existing law. 4
The first class of restrictions,-forbidding both parties
to marry again, with the same time limitation on both regardless of guilt,-naturally assumes the greatest importance, as it applies to all divorces granted, so that the
chances for its violation are much more numerous than is
triue of the purely penal restraint on the guilty party, which
lies in the discretion of the court.
Some light on the problem can be had from the statutory
law of Virginia, with a decision of the court construing it.
The Virginia code provides that when a divorce is granted
for any cause arising subsequent to marriage, neither party
can marry again for six months from the date of the decree;
and the marriage is not dissolved as to any marriage contracted after the decree, or in any prosecution therefore,
until the expiration of the six months.5 It further provides
that if any person marry, having a husband or wife living,
the marriage is void. 6 Under these provisions the court
held at the suit of the guilty party,-the woman having been
innocent,-that when a divorced person married a woman
out of the state, within the six month period set by law
as a restriction on marriage of divorced persons, both being
domiciled in Virginia, and returning there to live, the marriage was void.7 In an older leading Virginia case it was
decided that a marriage validly contracted in another jurisdiction between a white and a negro, both resident in VirUnderwood v. Underwood, 83 W. Va. 272, 98 S. E. 207 (1919).
'LEwIs' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCToN, 2nd Ed., §573 (1904).
5 VA. CODE, 1924, §5113.
a VA. CODE, 1924, §5087.
7 Heflinger v. Heffinger. 136 Va. 289, 118 S. E. 816 (1923).
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ginia and returning there to live, was void in Virginia because against the public policy of that state, as exemplified
in their statute making such marriage void.8 The decision
in the divorce case would seem to be consistent with the decision in the latter case, where the general rule, 9-- that a
marriagge valid where celebrated is valid everywhere,is app. oved of, but the exception is laid down that s such
marriage is against the public policy of the state of domicile
it will not be recognized. In other words, there seems to be
apparent the idea that both the state of marriage and the
state of domicile will pass upon the validity of marriages
of persons therein domiciled who go out of a state to marry
in spite of its laws, and return to live in the state whose
laws are being defied.10
In jurisdictions other than Virginia and West Virginia the
restrictions on both parties equally, regardless of guilt, will
be generally enforced even if the persons are married in
another state where such marriage is valid."1 An English
case treats such a restriction as a condition subsequent, and
holds that a party so bound cannot contract a valid marriage until the time limit has expired, on the ground that
there is no capacity to marry until this condition has determined. 12 Virginia follows this view. i3 If the public policy
of the state is to prevent hasty marriages of divorced persons, or to allow time for an appeal, this seems to be a
reasonable view.
Marriages by divorced persons, with time restrictions on
marrying again not yet expired, are commonly held void by
the courts if the statute they are interpreting expressly declares such a marriage void.' 4 They so hold,-even if the
marriage is contracted in another state where the parties go
to avoid the prohibition,-if they return to the state of domicile where the divorce was granted and the restraint im-

8 Kinney

v. Commonwealth, 30 Gratt. (Va.) 858 (1878).

0 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 7th Ed. §113 (1872) ; AMERICAN LAY INSTITUTE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Statement No. 2, §121 (a).

10 AImERicAN LAW INSTITUTE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Statement No. 2,
EVEasLsy, DomEsTsa RELATIONS, 4th Ed. c. 16, §1 (1926).

§121

(b);

21 Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 860, 117 N. W. 787 (1908).
12 warter v. warter, 15 Pro. Div. 152 (1890).
" N. 6, supra, where the court says, "The time when the divorce decree was to
become operative had not yet arrived, and until it did become operative there was no
divorce that fully dissolved the bond of the former marriage. * * the decree of divorce
is not operative at all as to a subsequent marriage until the expiration of six months
from the date of the decree. * * If not effective as a complete divorce in Virginia
until the expiration of six months, it was not so effective in Iaryland."
MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND DomEsTIc RELATIONS, 6th Ed.
14 2 SCI OULER,

§1924 (1921).
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posed. 115 If the statute under which the divorce was granted
so provides, such marrying party will be liable to criminal
prosecution, but it can only be for the crime which the statute names and not for criminal contempt for violating the
order of the court granting the divorce decree.', The courts
lay emphasis on the fact that the statutes treat the innocent
and the guilty alike,--where such is the fact,-and hold
that if a legislature defines the public policy in a state to
be against allowing speedy marriages after a divorce, in
any event, a marriage contracted in disregard of the posi7
tive statutory prohibition will be void wherever contracted.1
It is also, however,.flatly laid down that restrictions on marr~age after a divorce cannot have any extraterritorial effect, and that a party contracting a second marriage in a
foreign state and returning to the state of domicile cannot
be punished for bigamy.18 This last statement, however,
need not influence the West Virginia court, because the
legislature has provided that any married person who,
during the life of the husband or wife, marries another person within the state, or, if the marriage takes place outside
of the state, cohabits in the state with such other person,
shall be guilty of bigamy and be confined in the penitentiary.' 9
In the light of the wording of the West Virginia statutes,
and of the adjudications in various jurisdictions on the
point, it would seem that as to the fixed, statutory six
months restriction to prevent either divorced person from
marrying again within that time, the legislature intended
to have such marriages held void no matter where contracted. This view is further strengthened by the fact that
the marriage shall be void and the party shall be criminally liable as if no divorce had been granted. In interpreting statutes restricting marriage after granting h decree of
divorce the courts have been markedly influenced by the
presence or absence of such provisions, 20 as indicating legislative intent.
The other restrction,-on the guilty party alone,-preI Suvra, n. 18, §1980.
18 Supra, n. 18, §1933.
1?
I

Wilson v. Cook, 256 Ifl. 460, 100 N. E. 222 (1912).
KEEZER, MAR=IGE AND DivoRcE. 2nd Ed. 631 (1923).

"W. VA. CODn, 1928, c. 149, §1.
'

Supra, n.

18. §1924, 1930, 1933.
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211

sents a somewhat different aspect, in that it seems to be of
a penal nature, and it is generally held that a penal law can
have no extraterritorial effect. 21

So far as such marriages

within the state are concerned it has been held in West.Virginia that such restriction is valid and enforceable as a
reasonable regulation of marriage and divorce. In the
same case the provision for criminal prosecution is expressly held good; and also that the section of the code allowing restraints on divorced persons marrying again and fixing
penalties for a violation of it, repeals another statutory provision which stated that a divorced person who married
would not be liable for prosecution for bigamy. 22 The law
being valid as to marriages contracted within the state the
question arises as to whether the West Virginia court would
recognize one validly contracted, in another state under its
laws, by a party so restricted. It will be noted that the
code places the two classes of restrictions on an equal footing, and puts the same penalty on both. Does this not
indicate that they should be treated alike? The correct
result would seem to be, as stated above, that the first class
of restrictions should bind the parties no matter where they
are married. It would therefore seem that, as statutes are
to be construed as a whole with reference to any particular
subject,23 the legislature intended the second class to be
on the same footing, and that marriages contracted in other
states in violation of the restriction on the guilty party
should be held void in West Virginia, and the guilty party
be criminally punished as if no divorce had ever been
granted. This view is further strengthened on the theory
that,-by the express statutory provision, 24 making a married person, marrying again in another state, and cohabiting with the other person in this state, guilty of bigamy,-the legislature intended to penalize foreign marriages
which are deemed to be against the public policy of the
25
state.

-C.

P. W.

2 Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458 (1873) ; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 7th
Ed. §620 (1872).

=

State v. Snyder, 89 W. Va. 96, 108 S. E. 588 (1921).

- 2 LEWIS' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTucTION. §344 (1904).
" W. VA. CODE, 1923, c. 149, §1.
25 Supra, n. 21, §443.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1927

5

